Written as a policy paper for PUBPOL704 – Public Policy Case Study Analysis for the McMaster University Master of Public Policy in Digital Society. With special thanks to Rob Gillezeau and Parvinder Sachdeva, two of my mentors, for their belief in me.
Disclaimer: This paper is meant to start a discussion and I think of it more as a living draft. The policies I’m putting forward are just options, but I’m open to other opinions. I want to hear from musicians about whether this makes sense for them and how we can improve our music industry.
Introduction
The digitalization of music has fundamentally transformed the economic market for music: firms’ business models, the relationship between suppliers and consumers, and the method of consumption for music tracks as economic goods. After an era of file sharing and “pirating” that saw the decline of revenue in the recording music industry, the rise of music streaming services – such as Spotify, Apple Music, and TIDAL – have revolutionized how music is listened to by fans and the economics of the music business. The 2021 IFPI Global Music Report found that 62.1% of all global record music revenues come from streaming services, with 46% coming from paid subscriptions and 16.2% coming from ad-support streams, while Counterpoint Research found that there are almost 400 million music streaming service subscriptions in 2020.[1] The dominance of music streaming services will only grow over the coming years as subscriptions increased by 35% between 2019-2020 while total revenue from music streaming grew to $13.4 billion USD, amounting to 19.9% growth in 2020. However, while music streaming revenues have grown, music artists’ incomes have shrunk. The overall size of the pie has multiplied, but the sizes of the slices of pie have not. The revenue from music streaming services is not enough for music artists to make a living. With the COVID-19 pandemic shutting down live music shows, music artists have lost substantial sources of revenue from touring and merchandise sales. Thus, the livelihoods of music artists are threatened. This can lead to smaller, more independent artists being discouraged from making music and forcing them to leave the market, which would decrease the diversity and vibrance of the music industry.
This paper is an analysis of music streaming services, their consequences on the livelihoods of music artists, and potential policy solutions in the Canadian context. The paper also draws upon this author’s previous research on the economics of Spotify and music policy.[2] While there are multiple music streaming services, this paper will focus on Spotify as the fastest growing and pre-eminent firm to utilize the platform network business model with the promise of returning lost revenue to music labels and providing greater convenience to music fans. Spotify has amassed vertically integrated market power, an outsized market share of a third of all music streaming service paid subscribers, and “a higher market share than was held by retailers or radio stations in the digital era”[3]. In its emergence, Spotify took up the roles of every player in the music ecosystem and economic market. Spotify has attracted the vocal criticism of top music artists and media, and thus, is a natural focus point for understanding the impact of streaming on music artists’ livelihoods.
The Policy Problem
In the City of Toronto (Ontario, Canada) the cost of living (estimated from the Consumer Price Index) increased by 40 percent between 2002 and 2020.[4] However, the average total wages for “Professional occupations in art and culture [51]” – which includes Statistics Canada NOC code 5133 for “Musicians and singers” – between 2002 ($29,100) and the end of 2019 ($36,100) represents an increase of only 24%.[5] Incomes for music artists in Toronto are not keeping up with the cost of living in the city centre. Reports from the City of Austin (Texas, US), found that “81.2% of all respondents say that “Stagnating Pay for Musicians Makes It Difficult to Make a Viable Income” has an “Extreme or Strong Impact”” and “nearly one-third of them are earning $15,000 [USD] or less per year in pre-tax income (including all income sources).”[6]
While issues of precarity in music have existed long before the emergence of music streaming services, recent trends have accelerated the inequality between music “superstars” – like Drake, Beyonce, and Adele – and everyone else.[7] The problem can be redistributional in ensuring that all music artists can benefit from streaming revenues and not just the top superstars. However, there may not be a market failure as Spotify identified a need in the music industry with declining revenues in the digital era and that low revenues from streaming are better than no revenues due to pirating. If there is a market inefficiency, it may be the vertical integration and outsized US and European market share of Spotify leading to monopolistic power through network effects and the potential for payola, rent-seeking, and other anti-competitive behaviour. However, while further research is warranted, that analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. This is ultimately a fairness and labour justice issue where music artists are not adequately compensated for their work and the revenue of the product has not matched up to societal value of each music track and their creators. The policy problem is the lack of sustainable revenue from streaming for music artists and how the Canadian government can challenge music streaming services to better support Canadian musicians’ livelihoods.
The Economics of Spotify[8]
Spotify shares the same economic story as other digital technologies and other network platforms like Facebook and Netflix – the platform is mass reproducible with zero marginal cost, creating the advantage of large economies of scale. Spotify benefits from “network effects”: the more users that join, more data is collected, the better the algorithms develop, which entices more users to join the network or risk being left out.[9] This has led to the massive growth in paid subscribers and streams and ultimately, greater revenue. These network effects led to what Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro describe as “tipping” towards a natural monopoly. Music streaming has also changed the way consumers consume the music good. Before the digitization of music, each good – whether it was a CD, cassette, vinyl record, or other medium – was unique and owned by an individual once it was purchased. Instead, Spotify facilitates the ability for consumers to conveniently listen to a large library of music from many different music labels and rights holders. It acts more like a library or Blockbuster where you “rent” every single entry at the same time, rather than a store where you buy and own the unique good. Additionally, there is no scarcity for each track, so every song can be played by thousands or millions of listeners at the same time. Spotify acts like a broker between music rights holders and listeners in facilitating the exchange of payment for access, as well as a buyer in agreements with music labels to allow the platform the right to play their intellectual property in exchange for shared revenue.
Spotify also acts as a seller operating on a “freemium” business model, which allows consumers to pay for access in different ways. One tier adopts the fundamental programmatic advertising business model of the digital economy, where the use of the service is “free” in that consumers do not pay any currency, but instead are subject to advertisements and the collection of their data. The other tier, “Premium,” is a subscription model, where users pay a monthly or annual fee for ad-free access to Spotify’s music. Additionally, it also acts as a supplier for advertisers, as the platform collects users’ demographic data and listening habits and sells ad space – short promotional clips that interrupt continuous listening and are played after a few songs before restarting the music.
As a result of Spotify’s ability to scale certain musicians and songs through playlists and promotion, a super majority of streams go towards what economist Alan B. Krueger argues are a few top “superstars” and who take a large share of market demand and streaming income.[10] This disadvantage makes it more difficult for many smaller and independent musicians in the “long tail” to make a living, with a musician in the median earning only $100.[11] Spotify’s business model and its revenue sharing approach (which will be discussed below) leads to this “winner-take-all” economy that “has benefited a few stars, while the middle-income artist, like so much of the middle class in America, struggles to survive.”[12]
The Reality of Streaming Revenues: How are royalty rates calculated?
Much of the criticism about streaming services has been rhetorically based off “per-stream rates” – the revenue collected by music artist per stream play of their song. Public outcry has been around how per-stream rates are fractions of a cent. Through the website Trichordist, musician David Lowery calculates the per-stream rates of different music streaming services – mostly scoped to services operating in the US and Europe – by market share of revenue.[13] The calculations are based off data collected from a “mid-sized indie label” with a catalog of more than 350 albums and generating 1.5 billion streams annually. These figures are averages calculated “by taking the income generated by an individual recording, by an artist, or by a label, and dividing that income by number of streams achieved by that recording, artist or label.”[14] Spotify pays $0.00348 USD per stream, while Apple Music pays $0.00675 USD per stream and TIDAL pays the highest value of $0.00926 USD per stream.[15] With these numbers, the implication is that it will take thousands or millions of streams for a musician to earn substantial revenue off a song. A million streams of one song – to the naked eye, a relative success – is worth $3480 with these calculations. However, while this gives a general sense that it is difficult for music artists to earn substantial streaming revenue, it is too simplistic and misrepresentative of the actual welfare of musicians because it does not represent the dominant revenue sharing model used by the industry.
Most music streaming services, including Spotify, use a “pro-rata” revenue sharing model, where revenue is paid out to music labels, whose individual contractual agreements with their artists ultimately determine the income that musicians ultimately see. The actual rates are difficult to accurately calculate because Spotify’s agreements with each label and the number of streams per artists are not disclosed to the public. The best estimate is that Spotify pays around 65-75% of their gross revenue – mostly from subscription fees – to music rights holders and labels, and then keeps the other 25-35% for operating costs and profit.[16] Spotify then pools all streams played in a year and pays out this pot of revenue based on an artist’s share of overall streams. As a simplistic example, if Spotify had 100 billion streams in a given year and Drake had 1 billion streams or 1% of the total number of streams that year, Drake’s record label would receive 1% of that 65-75% revenue pot. With the understanding that a few “superstars” have a supermajority of the share of streams, what this model implies is that most music artists – especially independent musicians who may have a substantial number of streams but are only a fraction of the total share of streams – will not make a lot of revenue. With the previous example, if Canadian indie band Stars had 1.5 million streams of their music in a given year, their music label would only earn 0.000015% of the total pot of revenue. Furthermore, if the total number of streams increase but Stars’ streams stay constant while more Drake songs are played over and over again – which can be a result of greater playlist promotion or passive listening – that will reduce the total percentage share of streams for other musicians, and thus, bands like Stars would receive less revenue. What makes this model more complicated is that each music label has a different contractual agreement with Spotify and each music artist has a different negotiated royalty rate with their label. The model thus acts as a funnel where royalty revenues are divided at each step, starting from the streaming service and trickling down to a weak income stream when it reaches the music artist, who may not receive a revenue per song commensurate with the actual value of that song. This raises the issue of how to increase streaming revenues for artists and create greater income for musicians under the pro-rata business model. David Hesmondhalgh argues that the main ways are “(a) for the total pot to grow, through increased revenue; (b) for the MSS to pay more out to rights holders; and (c) for rights holders to provide better contractual terms to musicians.”[17] Policymakers thus have to consider the objective that potential policies are trying to achieve in increasing artists’ incomes through this pro-rata system.
Policy Solution 1: Copyright Law Reform
If the issue is the division of royalties among different stakeholders in the process and policymakers were looking at mandating music streaming services to pay more out to rights holders or increasing the rates labels pay their artists, copyright law reform might be an approach. In the United Kingdom and the US, policy debates have centred around royalty rates and the concept of the right to equitable renumeration. American legal scholar Molly Hogan argued that “These hardships cannot solely be attributed to the business decisions of record labels or companies like Spotify; rather, the overall method for calculating one’s royalties is a combined result of business decisions and existing federal copyright law, which was not written with today’s digital music landscape in mind.”[18] The UK House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee (DCMS) held hearings and released a report on the “Economics of music streaming” in 2021, which recognized that “major music companies have experienced historic profit margins,” while “performers, songwriters and composers receive only a small portion of revenue due to poor royalty rates.”[19] The report, thus, recommends introducing the right to equitable remuneration to music streaming through legislative reform of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act. The challenge in the UK is that there are inconsistencies with how music streams are classified, with major industry stakeholders and multinational record labels Universal, Sony and Warner arguing that music streaming be classified like a sale under the “making available” right and thus, performers are not covered by the right to equitable remuneration.[20] The report goes on to recommend “that performers enjoy the right to equitable remuneration for streaming income [by] amending the Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988 so that the making available right does not preclude the right to equitable remuneration.”[21] With this framework, the policy would not be targeting music streaming service companies, but rather the record labels and aiming to increase the amount paid out by the labels to their artists. In response to the report, Member of Parliament Kevin Brennan proposed a Private Members’ Bill known as the “Copyright (Rights and Remuneration of Musicians, Etc.) Bill,” or colloquially as the “Brennan Bill,” establishing the right to equitable remuneration to the “making available” classification.[22]
In the Canadian context, this would be sections 15-20 of the Copyright Act, 1985. In an analysis of this legal framework, a right “to be paid equitable remuneration” for both performers and sound recording makers exists under section 19 but it does not extend to “on-demand” streaming services.[23] The law makes an “except[ion] for a communication in the circumstances referred to in paragraph 15(1.1)(d) or 18(1.1)(a)” which refers to “telecommunication in a way that allows a member of the public to have access to the sound recording from a place and at a time individually chosen by that member of the public.” This wording implies that the right to equitable remuneration for music artists does not exist if the song is streamed on Spotify or another streaming service. To modernize this legislation for the modern streaming age, the right to equitable remuneration under section 19 must be extended to on-demand telecommunication and the exceptions in these clauses be stricken.
However, it remains to be seen how this reform is implemented practically and whether it would translate into a more effective policy regime and increase the total revenue for music artists. One consideration is that Canadian listeners represent just a small share of the total streams globally. Such a policy change may not lead to an effective change in an increase of revenue because Canadian streams are so little compared to the rest of the world. With the uncertainty of the practical effect of this policy change, it may not be the most ideal. While writing mostly about the American context, legal scholar Glenton Davis argues that “musicians should look for change beyond copyright law reform” and that “musicians eager for governmental intervention should champion such intervention through grants and subsidies” citing the Canada Music Fund (CMF) and The Foundation Assisting Canadian Talent on Recordings (FACTOR) as examples.[24]
Policy Solution 2: A User-Centric Revenue Sharing Model
A solution frequently suggested by vocal Spotify critics would be for music streaming services to switch over to a user-centric business model.[25] The Canadian government can mandate this through new legislation. Under Spotify’s current pro-rata business model, there exists little to no “connection between an individual listener’s payment and their listening preferences.”[26] A user-centric model would re-establish that connection, meaning that a user’s subscription fee is divided by the percentage share of that user’s streams per music artist. For example, if this author pays approximately $10 a month in subscription fees and 25% of the month’s streams were songs by Stars, $2.50 of that monthly subscription fee would go to Stars. Many advocates for this model argue that it would be fairer to more independent musicians, increase revenue for niche genres, and allow music listeners to directly support their favourite musicians. As Hesmondhalgh notes, such a change would favour musicians “further down the long tail” because they are “more likely… to own the rights to their recordings and underlying compositions, so they would keep a bigger proportion of whatever was paid out to rights holders.”[27]
However, there are a few flaws to this approach. Some studies found that this system would not lead to substantial changes in the revenue that music artists ultimately receive, and in certain cases, based on the market segment, may achieve the opposite effect of increasing the revenues of superstars rather than independent musicians. Quoting Muikku (2017), Hesmondhalgh notes that “‘results depend on the cumulative effects of both individual and user groups’ listening habits.’”[28] As former Spotify chief economist Will Page argued in his defense of the pro-rata system: “With the user-centric approach, the value of each stream would vary from listener to listener: a paid subscriber who streams a hundred songs per month would, in theory, give more to each artist than someone who listens to a thousand songs per month” and that royalty payouts would be “more volatile, and less predictable.”[29] Additionally, the administrative costs of mandating a shift in the revenue-sharing model may be high because the implementation of such a system might be too complex. “The extra administrative cost—say, figuring out what each person’s streams are worth each quarter and then distilling that into a semi-coherent pay statement—could actually leave artists with less money to go around,” Page argues.[30] Furthermore, it would be difficult to implement this policy regime jurisdictionally in Canada, as it would raise questions of who is covered under the implementation of these policies. Would Canadian listeners’ subscription fees be divided? Or would the listeners of Canadian music artists be affected? The complexity of calculating payouts just for Canada would negatively impact the financial operations of streaming services.
Ultimately, mandating a change in business models is more of “a decision about cultural values, not economic cost… With the existing streaming model, your money is not a direct investment—it is at the mercy of collective listening habits. Whether we want a system that rewards the conscious choices of individuals—versus, say, algorithms piping in modern-day muzak 24/7—is a question about more than dollars and (fractions of) cents.”[31] But if the policy objective is greater incomes for music artists, this policy solution may not be the most ideal.
Policy Solution 3: Direct Financial Support and Taxation
Lastly, the Canadian government could increase direct financial support for musicians through subsidies through already-existing initiatives, like the CMF and FACTOR, or through a newly established fund dedicated to delivering direct benefits for music artists. Greater investment in these funds and initiatives would be funded by taxes and fees collected from music streaming services. In this way, the government could support the livelihoods of Canadian musicians while not directly addressing complex structural changes in music streaming services that would be challenging in the Canadian context. In the previous parliamentary session before the 2021 Federal election, Bill C-10 – notwithstanding criticisms around content regulation – addressed this issue. Under the bill, music streaming services like Spotify would be reclassified as broadcasters under the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) regulatory framework, meaning that these companies would have to pay into the Canada Media Fund and other investments in Canadian content. Indeed, the fierce debate around Bill C-10 emerged because of a proposed amendment at the committee stage to remove a “loophole” that would exempt YouTube from the policy – despite it being one of the top music streaming services – thus ensuring that YouTube would contribute to investments in Canadian content.[32] The Department of Canadian Heritage estimated that “contributions by online broadcasters to Canadian content and creators could reach $830 million annually by 2023,” under the Bill C-10 policy change.[33]
Canadian music artists receive subsidies from a variety of programs on different levels of government, but of particular emphasis on the federal level is the Canada Music Fund and FACTOR. The program is an arms-length organization of the federal Department of Canadian Heritage, but also collects funding from private music broadcasters. It describes its mandate as providing support:
“to Canadian recording artists, songwriters, artist managers, record labels, music publishers, distributors, and event producers through numerous programs. Whether an artist is looking to record a few tracks, a full length sound recording, market and promote an existing album, or showcase and tour at home or abroad, funding is available.”[34]
The Liberal Party 2021 election platform proposed to increase the annual contribution to the CMF and FACTOR to $50 million by 2024-2025.[35] However, distribution of subsidies from these programs are mostly project-based. Each grant requires a particular purpose, whether it is subsidizing the recording and production of music, touring, music videos and other promotional material, or other events.
To better respond to the lack of sustainable income through streaming services for Canadian music artists, the federal government could either change the mandate of the CMF and FACTOR or establish a new funding mechanism that would directly financially support the livelihoods of musicians as an income benefit. This would be considered a supplement to other sources of income, like touring and merchandise. The benefit would be eligible for professional musicians under CMF or FACTOR criteria, making above a certain income threshold to ensure that it is not a sole source of income, and would be inaccessible for other musicians earning higher levels of income.
A key aspect of this policy framework would be to establish a tax on streaming services, of which the revenue would be invested back into this music artists’ income benefit. The proposed 3% “Digital Services Tax” might be applicable to music streaming services under the “online marketplace services revenue” definition.[36] However, it is unclear whether music streaming services fall under the purview of this policy, and it does not specify how that tax revenue might be spent. The establishment of a new 5% tax specifically targeted at the eligible Canadian revenue of music streaming services, tied explicitly to a new income benefit for Canadian music artists, would address the flaws in music streaming while substantially improving musicians’ livelihoods.
Recommendation, Costing, and Performance Measuring
A policy framework of direct financial support for Canadian musicians through an income supplement benefit with strict eligibility criteria, which would be funded by the imposition of a tax on eligible Canadian music streaming revenue, would be the most effective solution in addressing the lack of sustainable revenue from streaming for music artists. Reforming section 19 of the Copyright Act or exploring other copyright law reform may not be effective in substantially increasing the income of Canadian musicians and will gather the opposition of major music labels. Mandating a shift in the business model of streaming services towards a user-centric approach would gather opposition from music streaming companies like Spotify, Google, and Apple, and would be too complex and financially burdensome to effectively implement.
Creating a new income benefit program would substantially increase the operational costs of the Department of Canadian Heritage and require a significant investment to the CMF beyond the proposed $50 million in the Liberal Party 2021 election platform. If it is estimated that Canadian paid subscribers are approximately 1/20-1/10 of US paid subscribers – as per a recent report by Wall Communications, commissioned by Canadian Heritage – and the current estimate of US paid subscribers are 82 million, there are potentially 4.1-8.2 million Canadian paid subscribers.[37] Conservatively assuming the average cost of subscriptions are $10/month CAD, current total Canadian streaming service subscription revenues are around $410-820 million annually. If we estimate that the tax-eligible Canadian revenue is $600 million and it were taxed at a rate of 5% – which is a rate proposed in a report of the estimated impact of Bill C-10 – the total tax revenue would be approximately $30 million. By 2024-2025, with an additional increase of $25 million above the $50 million proposed in the Liberal Party 2021 election platform, combined with the revenue from the tax, the total budget of the Canada Music Fund would be $110 million. The Canada Council for the Arts estimates that the number of “musicians and singers” working in the “Arts, entertainment & recreation” and “Information & cultural industries” segments is approximately 12,600.[38] For an annual income benefit of $5000 CAD per eligible musician, the cost would be $63 million. The remaining $47 million would be dedicated to the traditional FACTOR funding streams and other operational costs. Success of this policy would be measured by an increase in the median net income made by individuals under the Statistics Canada NOC code 5133 for “Musicians and singers,” as well as an increase of the number of professionals under that classification because a policy objective would be to ensure that musicians are not exiting the economic market due to being unable to afford a living.
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[1] “IFPI Global Music Report 2021” (IFPI, 2021), 11–13, https://gmr2021.ifpi.org/; “Global Online Music Streaming Growth Slowed Down in Q2 2020,” Counterpoint Research (blog), October 6, 2020, https://www.counterpointresearch.com/global-online-music-streaming-growth-slowed-down-in-q2-2020/.
[2] Angelo Mateo, “The Economics of Spotify (Written for PUBPOL 702)” (McMaster University, December 27, 2021).
[3] Luis Aguiar and Joel Waldfogel, “Platforms, Power, and Promotion: Evidence from Spotify Playlists,” The Journal of Industrial Economics 69, no. 3 (2021): 688, https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12263; Mark Mulligan, “Global Music Subscriber Market Shares Q1 2021,” MIDiA Research, July 9, 2021, https://www.midiaresearch.com/blog/global-music-subscriber-market-shares-q1-2021.
[4] Statistics Canada, “Table 18-10-0004-11 Consumer Price Index, by Geography, Monthly, Percentage Change, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Provinces, Whitehorse and Yellowknife” (Government of Canada, n.d.), https://doi.org/10.25318/1810000401-eng.
[5] Statistics Canada, “Table 14100340 – Employee Wages by Occupation, Annual” (Government of Canada, March 5, 2020), https://open.canada.ca/data/en/dataset/1d092695-931c-4cbd-b199-7dd879e2108d.
[6] Nikki Rowling and Alissa McCain, “The Austin Music Census: A Data-Driven Assessment of Austin’s Commercial Music Economy” (Titan Music Group, June 1, 2015), 9.
[7] Alan B. Krueger, Rockonomics: A Backstage Tour of What the Music Industry Can Teach Us about Economics and Life, First edition (New York: Currency, 2019).
[8] This section contains excerpts from this author’s previous research in Mateo, “The Economics of Spotify.”
[9] Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, “Systems Competition and Network Effects,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 8, no. 2 (June 1994): 93–115, https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.8.2.93.
[10] Krueger, Rockonomics.
[11] Krueger.
[12] Krueger; David Dayen, “Islands in the Stream,” The American Prospect, March 22, 2021, https://prospect.org/api/content/b969aae6-89e3-11eb-a885-1244d5f7c7c6/.
[13] The Trichordist, “2019-2020 Streaming Price Bible : YouTube Is STILL The #1 Problem To Solve,” The Trichordist (blog), March 5, 2020, https://thetrichordist.com/2020/03/05/2019-2020-streaming-price-bible-youtube-is-still-the-1-problem-to-solve/.
[14] David Hesmondhalgh, “Is Music Streaming Bad for Musicians? Problems of Evidence and Argument,” New Media & Society, September 19, 2020, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/citedby/10.1177/1461444820953541.
[15] The Trichordist, “2019-2020 Streaming Price Bible.”
[16] Hesmondhalgh, “Is Music Streaming Bad for Musicians?,” 3600.
[17] Hesmondhalgh, 3600. “MSS” means “music streaming service.”
[18] Molly Hogan, “Upstream Effects of the Streaming Revolution: A Look into the Law and Economics of a Spotify-Dominated Music Industry Student Notes,” Colorado Technology Law Journal 14, no. 1 (2016 2015): 134.
[19] United Kingdom Parliament Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, “Economics of Music Streaming,” Session 2021-22 (United Kingdom: United Kingdom House of Commons, July 15, 2021), 3.
[20] United Kingdom Parliament Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 35–39.
[21] United Kingdom Parliament Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 43.
[22] MP Kevin Brennan, “Copyright (Rights and Remuneration of Musicians, Etc.) Bill – Proposed, Not yet Enacted” (2021).
[23] Canada, “Copyright Act, 1985,” RSC 1985, c C-42 § (1985), https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-c-42/latest/rsc-1985-c-c-42.html.
[24] Glenton Davis, “When Copyright Is Not Enough: Deconstructing Why, as the Modern Music Industry Takes, Musicians Continue to Make,” Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 16, no. 2 (2016): 396.
[25] Andy Cush, “How Musicians Are Fighting for Streaming Pay During the Pandemic,” Pitchfork, June 29, 2020, https://pitchfork.com/features/article/how-musicians-are-fighting-for-streaming-pay-during-the-pandemic/; Marc Hogan, “Is There a Fairer Way for Streaming Services to Pay Artists?,” Pitchfork, October 3, 2019, https://pitchfork.com/thepitch/is-there-a-fairer-way-for-streaming-services-to-pay-artists/; Hesmondhalgh, “Is Music Streaming Bad for Musicians?”
[26] Lee Marshall, “‘Let’s Keep Music Special. F—Spotify’: On-Demand Streaming and the Controversy over Artist Royalties,” Creative Industries Journal 8, no. 2 (July 3, 2015): 186, https://doi.org/10.1080/17510694.2015.1096618.
[27] Hesmondhalgh, “Is Music Streaming Bad for Musicians?,” 3609.
[28] Hesmondhalgh, 3609.
[29] Hogan, “Is There a Fairer Way for Streaming Services to Pay Artists?”
[30] Hogan.
[31] Hogan.
[32] Rachel Aiello, “Is the Government Trying to Regulate the Videos You Post? What You Need to Know about Bill C-10,” CTV News, May 4, 2021, sec. Politics, 10, https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/is-the-government-trying-to-regulate-the-videos-you-post-what-you-need-to-know-about-bill-c-10-1.5414080; Menaka Raman-Wilms and Bill Curry, “What Is Bill C-10 and Why Are the Liberals Planning to Regulate the Internet?,” The Globe and Mail, May 20, 2021, 10, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-what-is-bill-c-10-and-why-are-the-liberals-planning-to-regulate-the/.
[33] Government of Canada, “Fact Sheet – Estimated Impact of Bill C-10 and $830 Million Projection,” July 7, 2021, https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/corporate/transparency/open-government/standing-committee/guilbeault-bill-c10-amend-broadcasting-act/fact-sheet-respecting-values-ethics.html.
[34] “Our Mandate,” FACTOR Canada (blog), June 18, 2015, https://www.factor.ca/about-the-foundation/our-mandate/.
[35] Liberal Party of Canada, “‘Forward. For Everyone.’ Liberal Party of Canada 2021 Election Platform,” 2021, 26.
[36] Government of Canada, “Notice of Ways and Means Motion to Introduce an Act to Implement a Digital Services Tax,” n.d., https://fin.canada.ca/drleg-apl/2021/bia-leb-1221-1-l-eng.html.
[37] “U.S. Paid Music Subscribers 2021,” Statista, n.d., https://www.statista.com/statistics/707103/paid-streaming-music-subscribers-usa/; Canadian Heritage, “Study on the Economic Impacts of Music Streaming Platforms on Canadian Creators,” August 21, 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/copyright-policy-publications/economic-impacts-music-streaming.html.
[38] Kelly Hill, “A Statistical Profile of Artists in Canada in 2016” (Canadian Heritage, Canada Council for the Arts, Ontario Arts Council, November 2019), https://canadacouncil.ca/research/research-library/2019/03/a-statistical-profile-of-artists-in-canada-in-2016.