Written as a paper for PUBPOL708 – Digital Democracy with Professors Tony Porter and Netina Tan for the McMaster University Master of Public Policy in Digital Society.
Introduction
The digital governance of the Internet and emerging technologies – including, but not limited to, artificial intelligence (AI), 5G connectivity, and facial recognition technology – is increasingly being fragmented along the fault lines of the evolving geopolitical world. With the rise of China as a global power, Russia’s recent aggressive military and cyberattack actions, and the decline of American influence internationally, the world is dividing into democracies and emerging authoritarian states. This might be a simplistic outlook on modern geopolitics as the democracies like the United States (U.S.) and European Union (EU) states often pursue different governance approaches, and China and Russia have different values and geopolitical strategies. However, this divide is also happening in the digital realm, with the rise of digital authoritarianism, aggressive cyber attacks and Internet shutdowns, and decline of democratic values in digital contexts. This paper will focus primarily on China because it has been the leader in exercising soft and financial power in the development of non-Western, lower-income countries through digital infrastructure investment through the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and Digital Silk Road (DSR). In a fragmented geopolitical world divided by digital democracies – led by the U.S. and the EU – on one side and digital authoritarianism – led primarily by China – on the other side, there are emerging challenges, but also opportunities for Canada to pursue a different approach that prioritizes Canada’s democratic and human rights values and exercise international leadership in digital foreign policy.
The idea of Canada as a “middle power” in international relations dates back to the Cold War when Canada “influenced events through moral leadership, peacekeeping and conflict mediation,” navigating between the influence of the American and Soviet superpowers.[1] While modern democracies struggle to find a common approach to respond to the rise of authoritarianism globally, Canada must take advantage of this opportunity to show international leadership and pursue a different approach from the U.S. and the EU in advocating for digital democracy. As the incoming 2022 Chair of the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC) – an alliance of digital democracies that share similar digital governance democratic values – and with a new electoral mandate for Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly, Canada has the opportunity to develop a new strategy and coordinated approach for digital democracies – an “Ottawa Agenda” for democratic digital governance – to show international leadership. Through leading the drafting of joint statements, United Nations (UN) resolutions, and other international documents, as well as through recent strategic documents – such as drafts of the FOC Program of Action 2022, Summit for Democracy submissions, and speeches by the Prime Minister and Deputy Ministers (DM) – Canada has outlined the digital values it has advocated for in recent years and what it hopes to prioritize in coming years. Through the thematic concept of “digital inclusion,” the government will advocate for Internet freedom and human rights in digital contexts, such as free expression, association, assembly, and privacy online, as well as bridging the global digital divide. A key priority is advancing Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy through addressing the gender-based digital divide and gender-based violence online.[2] Canada can do so through its main objectives of shaping global norms, multi-stakeholderism, and engaging non-Western countries. In building an international digital normative framework, Canada should and has signalled it will advocate for applying existing international human rights law (IHRL) to digital contexts to ensure “the human rights enjoyed by people offline must also be protected online.”[3] Canada also has the advantage of domestic expertise in civil society, academia, and the private sector to engage in a multi-stakeholder approach that draws on the views and concerns of all aspects of society. Thus, multi-stakeholder engagement will empower a more effective multilateralism where Canada must amplify the perspectives of non-Western developing countries, and in doing so, would counter China’s engagement with the “Global South” to include them in their global sphere of influence.
This paper will first explore China’s vision for international digital influence through its BRI and DSR programs and its spread of digital authoritarianism globally. Then, this paper will outline Canada’s views on the increasingly fragmented geopolitical world. This paper will outline in greater detail a strategic vision and foreign policy framework for advancing Canada’s democratic and human rights values through an analysis of Canadian-led international initiatives on digital policy. The paper will then analyze China and Russia’s views on digital governance that emphasizes digital sovereignty over a human rights-based approach. Lastly, this paper will analyze government public statements and documents outlining Canada’s digital foreign policy priorities in recent months – especially since the September 2021 Federal election – and propose additional opportunities for Canada to exert influence internationally to be a leader in digital foreign policy.
China, The Belt and Road Initiative, and The Digital Silk Road
China’s rise as a global superpower and its growing international influence has been a result of its soft and financial power in building infrastructure globally, especially in developing countries. The Belt and Road Initiative, which was launched in 2013, is China’s plan to connect China with the rest of the Eurasian continent, the Asian-Pacific region, and to Africa through investments in infrastructure development – in particular, transportation and communications projects in order to increase trade.[4] The BRI is central to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “vision for moving China closer to the center of everything through infrastructure projects, trade deals, people-to-people ties, and policy coordination,” and thus, emerge as a global superpower by including developing countries abandoned by the West’s withdrawal from international affairs into China’s global sphere of influence.[5] The BRI consists primarily of bi-lateral agreements and Memorandums of Understanding between China and international governments, of which 140 countries have joined.[6]
Beginning in 2015, Xi began outlining a vision for a Sino-centric world of digital communications technology through the development of telecommunications infrastructure globally. Xi envisioned “a world of competing digital ecosystems, each with its own equipment and standards,” through leveraging Chinese digital expertise to split “US-allied liberal democracies on the one side and countries dependent on Chinese-based information and communications technology (ICT) on the other.”[7] China would build “‘cross-border optical cables and other communications truck line networks… ‘to pursue innovation-driven development, to intensify cooperation in frontier technological areas such as digital economy, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology and quantum computing, and to advance the development of big data, cloud computing and smart cities so as to turn them into a digital silk road of the 21st Century.’”[8] This conceptual theme of the “Digital Silk Road” was chosen purposefully to evoke the ancient trade routes that connected China to the rest of the world in the pre-modern era and share Chinese culture.[9] However, beneath the political rhetoric, the DSR is Xi’s grand foreign policy initiative to grow Chinese global influence and position the country as the digital technology leader, and thus the pre-eminent geopolitical superpower in modern international relations.
The DSR has leveraged China’s private sector to build digital communications infrastructure and other “digital economic platforms, financial technology and security-related services and platforms,” and especially 5G infrastructure in recent years.[10] Chinese state-owned telecommunications companies have entered markets in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.[11] Huawei, which operates in over 170 countries worldwide, has built 70 percent of the 4G network in Africa, and the firm hopes to be the leader in 5G infrastructure construction in the coming years.[12] China is connecting countries like Pakistan, Djibouti, Nigeria, and Belarus through international cables and satellites.[13] Other companies like Hikvision, Dahua, Hengtong, and Beidou are building surveillance cameras, fiber optic and submarine cables, and comprehensive GPS coverage throughout the developing world.[14] China is also focusing on building technological standards through the development of Chinese infrastructure internationally, but also through advocacy in standards setting international organizations to ensure Chinese dominance of digital ecosystems.[15] Through these initiatives, China hopes for exponential growth in its communications networks, and thus global trade, through the economic benefit of network effects. China’s vision is “to carry, store, and mine more of the world’s data while keeping its own networks out of reach,” of foreign interference, while “further integrat[ing] Chinese technologies and standards into the digital ecosystems of the least developed, emerging, and developed economies alike.”[16] The implication is for China and its private sector companies to have control of digital and communications technology, including its international governance, separate from the interference of the U.S. and the EU and to be able to exert its power and advance its interests and values in the global digital ecosystem they built. This is one way to conceptualize the idea of the “Splinternet.”
The challenge for digital democracies is that China will exert its authoritarian and anti-democratic values over its controlled digital ecosystem. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wields control and power over its isolated and guarded domestic telecommunications networks to monitor, censor, surveil, and ultimately control its citizens and stamp out any political dissent. AI, surveillance, and facial recognition technology is being used to control ethnic minorities, especially with the Muslim Uyghur minority centralized in the Xinjiang Region as well as those living throughout the country. The concern is that China will use this power throughout the developing world to contribute to Internet shutdowns and shut down human rights, such as freedoms of expression, association, and assembly. The Western world is questioning “the relationship between the Chinese state, the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese private-sector companies” and how the CCP can act through these international firms to exert power.[17] Articles 7 and 14 of China’s 2018 National Intelligence Law grants national security agencies the power to compel citizens and organizations to assist in their work, thus justifying the concerns around companies like Huawei helping in China’s surveillance work through its global infrastructure work.[18] This has grand implications on modern day statecraft since it could allow China to disrupt global communications, shut down the Internet or assist in national shutdowns by other authoritarian governments, spy on foreign governments, and compromise the national security of digital democracies.
Canada’s View on the Fragmentation of the Digital World
The Trans-Atlantic democracies have failed to develop a common approach to regulating technology and challenging the rise of digital authoritarianism. Cooperation between digital democracies have been undercut by “disagreements over data flows, content regulation, and digital taxes.”[19] In its disagreements, the EU is pushing for a separate approach from the U.S. that plays “a middle option between the open U.S. model and the state-centric Chinese model.”[20] Additionally, as a result of this lack of Trans-Atlantic cooperation, digital democracies have so far failed to engage non-Western developing countries. A key priority is India which is nominally an electoral democracy but has exhibited autocratic behaviour especially with internet shutdowns in the light of protests against recent agricultural laws by farmers in 2021.[21] Non-governmental organization Freedom House gave India a “Freedom on the Net Index” score of 49/100 in the past year. Without digital democracies engaging developing countries like India and promoting democratic and human rights values in periphery nations, China is taking the opportunity to create fissures in the global order and add more states to their own sphere of influence.
Canada is also seeing the digital world as increasingly being bifurcated along geopolitical lines. In Canada’s Program of Action for its 2022 FOC Chairship, it recognizes that “current trends, including the rise of digital authoritarianism, are accelerating the global erosion of democracy,” such as:
“increasing instances of intentional disruptions to online networks and internet shutdowns, cross-border attacks on freedom of expression online, the deployment of arbitrary or unlawful surveillance technology, and the proliferation of disinformation online. Moreover, digital divides are widening, which exacerbates gender and other inequalities among and within countries. These unprecedented challenges illustrate the need to advocate with renewed vigor for a free, open and secure internet and to stop the advance of digital authoritarianism.”[22]
In a speech at the 2021 FOC Conference, DM Marta Morgan noted that authoritarian states and other non-state actors are exploiting the democratic deficit and the mistrust of public institutions in Western democracies to advance their interests. Prime Minister Trudeau, in Canada’s submission to the 2021 US-led Summit for Democracy, noted that “Transgressors – both states and non-state actors – are behaving more boldly, and with increasing impunity. They are seeking to undermine the agreements and principles that underpin the international human rights system.”[23] While Canada still affirms that technology has great potential for digital inclusion and development, Trudeau also recognizes that emerging technologies “can also be used to control public discourse, undermine privacy and enable targeted manipulation through advertisement, censorship and unlawful surveillance, and the proliferation of disinformation and harmful content.”[24]
Canada’s Opportunities: A Democratic and Human Rights-based Digital Foreign Policy Framework
With the growing digital divide between democracies and authoritarianism, a lack of cooperation between the Trans-Atlantic democracies, and the failure to engage non-Western developing countries in digital governance, Canada faces the challenge of being trapped in another “Cold War.” However, like the Cold War of the twentieth century, Canada has a unique opportunity to be a “middle power” and position itself as a leader in digital foreign policy and governance by advocating for Canadian democratic and human rights values. It must do so by adopting many of the strategies of the Cold War: promoting the rule of law in international human rights and engaging in multilateralism in international fora and with diplomatic dialogue with developing countries, like Canada did with the Cold War “Non-Aligned Movement.” Canada must also take a multi-stakeholder approach to leverage the expertise and perspectives of civil society, academia, and the private sector.
Canada’s Chairship of the FOC in 2022 is an ideal opportunity to begin showing leadership in international digital governance and coordinate between countries with similar democratic values at international for a by developing a new “Ottawa Agenda.”[25] While the plan is to engage in future multi-stakeholder discussions for what this “Ottawa Agenda” would entail, Canadian statements and international initiatives on digital policy provide a framework of Canadian digital foreign policy priorities. The Government of Canada’s website on “Human rights and inclusion in online and digital contexts” provides a starting point for understanding Canada’s priorities.[26] It begins with the affirmation that “The rights and freedoms that individuals have offline must also be protected online,” and that those rights include “online freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, as well as to protect privacy online.” The Government of Canada has stated that they will “advocate for the continued relevance of existing international frameworks, including international human rights law, in the global governance of emerging technologies, such as AI.”[27] Unlike the Chinese and Russian approaches of developing new digital governance norms that emphasize “digital sovereignty,” Canada is arguing that IHRL already addresses the unique nature of the digital sphere. With this commitment, Canada is advocating that the shaping of global digital governance norms must take a human rights-based approach that is consistent with the existing IHRL canon, including Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
In 2016, Canada led the drafting of UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Resolution A/HRC/RES/32/13 which passed by unanimous consensus of the Council. The resolution states that Council members,
“1. Affirms that the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online, in particular freedom of expression, which is applicable regardless of frontiers and through any media of one’s choice, in accordance with article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;”[28]
thus aligning with Canada’s assertion of IHRL in digital contexts.
Another key priority theme for Canada is “digital inclusion,” stating that “Democracy in a digital age begins with promoting digital inclusion so an informed and engaged citizenry can participate meaningfully in society both online and offline. This requires connectivity and digital literacy, as well as guarantees of civic participation and safety online.”[29] UNHRC Resolution A/HRC/RES/32/13, paragraph 2,
“2. Recognizes the global and open nature of the Internet as a driving force in accelerating progress towards development in its various forms, including in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals;”[30]
and in subsequent paragraphs, recognizes the role of international cooperation to achieve quality education, digital literacy, and bridging the digital divide. Canada also recognizes that digital inclusion means freedom and security on the Internet and fighting against “measures to intentionally prevent or disrupt access to or dissemination of information online,” and “advocacy of hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination or violence on the Internet.”[31]
A key foreign policy priority for Canada has been its “Feminist International Assistance Policy” (FIAP).[32] Canada has advocated for gender-based inclusion, protection, and international development, beginning with Chrystia Freeland’s time as Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2017. FIAP continues to influence Canada’s digital foreign policy, starting with the publication of the “Playbook for Gender Equality in the Digital Age” in 2018. In the “Playbook,” “Canada acknowledges that new technologies offer opportunities to empower individuals, advance gender equality, and promote and protect human rights, but have also enabled new emerging threats, such as technology facilitated sexual and gender based violence.”[33] Canada has taken substantive actions to promote these values on the international stage in its digital foreign policy. UNHRC Resolution A/HRC/RES/32/13 seeks to “bridge the gender digital divide” and condemns “gender-based violence” online. Canada has also shown leadership on this issue by leading the drafting of the 2018 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/38/5, “Accelerating efforts to eliminate violence against women and girls: preventing and responding to violence against women and girls in digital contexts” and the “G7 Commitment to End Sexual and Gender-Based Violence, Abuse and Harassment in Digital Contexts.”
Canada is also committing to multi-stakeholder digital governance by stating that it “continuously engages civil society and the private sector in a constructive dialogue on pressing issues related to Internet freedom.”[34] At the 2021 FOC Conference, DM Morgan asserted that effective multilateralism needs multi-stakeholderism, meaning that if Canada wants to be a diplomatic leader on digital foreign policy, it must engage stakeholders from all aspects of society.[35] UN Resolution A/HRC/RES/32/13 also notes that it is important to engage “with all relevant stakeholders, including civil society, private sector, the technical community and academia, in promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms online.”[36] This model of digital governance believes that it is necessary to have participation from all stakeholders to develop an effective legal and policy framework for the unique nature of the Internet.
Case Study: Canada’s Foreign Policy on the Governance of AI
Canada’s digital foreign policy framework outlined above can be seen in the government’s work on the development of international instruments governing AI. Canada was a leader in drafting both the FOC Joint Statement on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights and the recent UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. Present in those documents are footprints of Canada’s digital foreign policy priorities. The FOC Joint Statement recognizes that AI “offer[s] unprecedented opportunities for human development and innovation, with the potential to generate social and economic benefits and help protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms” and that these technologies can assist in achieving the UN Sustainable Goals.[37] However, the statement also notes that it is concerned by the use of these technologies “for repressive and authoritarian purposes, including through remote biometric identification (RBI) such as facial recognition technology, as well as automated content moderation.”[38] The statement follows Canada’s approach of states respecting IHRL in “the design, development and use of AI systems in the public sector,” and “protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises.”[39] It again emphasizes the importance of multi-stakeholder engagement with civil society, academia, and the private sector “in the development of relevant norms, rules, and standards for the… governance of AI systems… consistent with international human rights law.”[40] Understanding that Canada was a leader in drafting this joint statement, it is clear that it is consistent with Canada’s digital foreign policy priorities.
Furthermore, the UNESCO Recommendations also align with Canada’s priorities. It asserts that “respect, protection and promotion of human dignity and rights as established by international law, including international human rights law, is essential throughout the life cycle of AI systems.”[41] It also advocates for principles of digital inclusion, especially gender-based inclusion, asserting the Recommendations’ objectives must “to protect, promote and respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, human dignity and equality, including gender equality…”[42] The Recommendations also notes that “Participation of different stakeholders throughout the AI system life cycle is necessary for inclusive approaches to AI governance… includ[ing] but are not limited to governments, intergovernmental organizations, the technical community, civil society, researchers and academia, media, education, policy-makers, private sector companies, human rights institutions and equality bodies, anti-discrimination monitoring bodies, and groups for youth and children.”[43] Of particular interest is that this paragraph also includes “Indigenous Peoples [and] respect for the self-governance of their data,” which is a priority for Canada as it grapples with reconciliation with Indigenous peoples, as well as the implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.[44] The inclusion of these principles in the document shows Canada’s commitment to these values in its diplomacy in international fora and in multilateral dialogue, especially in the contested space of AI governance norm building.
The China-Russian Model of Digital Governance and Diplomacy
China and Russia have both been active in international fora promoting an alternative model than the human-rights based governance framework being advocated by Canada and other digital democracies. Chinese leaders and diplomats have pushed to enshrine the concept of digital/cyber sovereignty internationally. In a speech by Xi at the 2015 World Internet Conference in Wuzhen, this concept means “respecting each country’s right to choose its own internet development path, its own internet management model, and its own public policies on the internet.”[45] Together with Russia, the two authoritarian governments are pushing for a new UN treaty that enshrines this principle. This led to a Russian-led UN resolution in December 2019 to establish a committee of experts to study the development of such a treaty.[46] China has been the leading norm entrepreneur of these principles in international dialogues. It has done so through Chinese hosted multi-stakeholder international conferences, dialogue with other countries in their sphere of influence, which includes countries that are part of the BRI and DSR programs, and in international fora – particularly standards setting organizations, such as the International Standardization Organization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Committee (IEC).[47]
In a debate on the 2021 UNHRC Resolution A/HRC/RES/47/16 on “The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet,” China – along with Cameroon, Eritrea, and Venezuela – abstained in the vote to adopt the resolution, which ultimately passed with the support of 43 countries.[48] In a speech by the Chinese representative to the Council, the representative outlined China’s views on digital governance and the application of IHRL on digital governance.[49] In particular, the Chinese representative emphasized the application of the rule of law on the internet. However, in contrast with Canada’s push for a human-rights based rule of law on the Internet, China prioritized national safety and public order, as well as “the importance of combatting criminal, illegal information, and instigation for violence, discrimination, xenophobia, and other related false information on the Internet.”[50] This understanding of the rule of law empowers China to potentially crackdown on what it considers to be criminal activity within its jurisdiction, including political dissent. The Chinese representative disagrees with the concept of “human rights as the basis” of this resolution, arguing that this approach “does not have clear legal definition.”[51] This is in direct opposition to Canada’s priority of applying existing IHRL in digital contexts. As an alternative, China mentions that the resolution does not “mention the sovereign right of states to manage the Internet,” again pushing for a governance model of digital sovereignty. To this end, China proposed three amendments that weakened the emphasis on a “human rights-based approach” in favour of ensuring the states should address what it deems to be criminal activity.[52] Those amendments were ultimately rejected by the Council and the resolution was passed without Chinese support.
Canada’s Strategic Vision for Digital Foreign Policy in 2022
Canada envisions its role in the coming years as an opportunity to be a global leader in digital foreign policy and to advocate for democratic norms and human rights in digital contexts. The government has thus signalled in statements and documents that it will push for many of the principles it has advocated for in previous diplomatic efforts, while further clarifying its objectives in concrete terms. In the Prime Minister’s Mandate Letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trudeau emphasized “the promotion of democracy, human rights, gender equality and the rule of law… at the core of Canada’s foreign policy.”[53] With this mandate of promoting Canadian democratic values, he has tasked Minister Joly with leading a “digital policy task force to position Canada as a global leader in the digital domain,” as well as “deter[ring] cyber threat actors, and promot[ing] norms-based international behavior in cyberspace.”[54]
Additionally, in the Prime Minister’s submission to the Summit for Democracy, Canada has committed to promoting Canadian democratic and human rights values in digital contexts at international fora. In particular, Canada has committed to “address[ing] the gender dimensions of cyber security, notably by advocating that gender considerations be mainstreamed at ongoing and upcoming UN cyber processes. The Prime Minister has also emphasized a multi-stakeholder approach that engages with developing countries as a way to include periphery states into discussions of digital governance, including “solidarity with development cooperation partners… and the importance of the Inter-American Democratic Charter… to build consensus in advance of the Summit of the Americas in 2022.”[55]
Canada envisions its most important opportunity to be a leader in digital foreign policy with the Chairship of the FOC in 2022. In a speech by DM Morgan at the 2021 FOC Conference, Morgan outlined Canada’s priorities for its Chairship, emphasizing the vision of a rules-based, democratic, and digitally inclusive world through the implementation of the calls to action in the 2021 Helsinki Declaration.[56] Morgan argues that with “authoritarian states exploiting the democratic deficit,” greater surveillance abroad, and “unregulated rise of big tech firms,” “democracies must act” on opportunities and challenges for greater digital inclusion. This includes a priority to address online gender-based violence, aligning with Canada’s FIAP. To achieve effective multilateralism, Canada believes that the FOC must pursue a multi-stakeholder approach to pursue shared democratic values and principles in digital contexts.
In a draft of Canada’s Program of Action for its Chairship, the government reaffirms Canada’s digital foreign policy initiatives, recognizing that the FOC plays a key role in “stop[ping] the advance of digital authoritarianism… [by] advocat[ing] with renewed vigor for a free, open and secure internet.”[57] It outlines four pillars for the advocacy of digital inclusion: 1) Meaningful connectivity and access, 2) Digital literacy, 3) Civic participation “free from oppressive practices,” and 4) Online safety. To support these principles, Canada proposes three key approaches for action: 1) “Shaping global norms,” 2) “multi-stakeholder engagement,” and 3) “ramping up advocacy, communication, and outreach.” With this framework, Canada hopes to develop an “Ottawa Agenda” for democratic digital governance to lead the coordination of FOC member states in its diplomatic initiatives.
To shape global norms, Canada is prioritizing “strengthening and expanding diplomatic networks, coordinated by local FOC representatives, to share information, coordinate positions and advance strategies to promote Internet freedom and human rights online in priority forums.”[58] This is consistent with Canada’s priorities of showing leadership on digital democracy in international bodies like the UN HRC, the UN General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee to Elaborate a Comprehensive International Convention on Cybercrime Countering the Use of Information and Communications Technologies for Criminal Purposes, the Internet Governance Forum, and the International Telecommunication Union. At these international organizations, Canada can continue to push for the application of IHRL in digital contexts. Canada will also “organize civil society consultations” that are “gender-responsive and inclusive.”[59] One highlighted forum that Canada is committing to engage is the Organization of American States (OAS) and its “Americas Dialogue on Freedom of Expression Online.” Canada can take this middle power approach by engaging with non-Western states and other less developed countries in the Americas and coordinate norm building that promotes Canadian digital democracy values. Building on Canada’s efforts to enshrine democratic and human rights norms in AI governance, Canada is pushing for the FOC “to counter repressive and authoritarian use and deployment of AI systems” and support the implementation of Canadian-led international documents like the aforementioned UNESCO Recommendations and the OECD AI Principles.
Canada will also continue to take the multi-stakeholder approach in its Chairship to “promote expertise, diversity, inclusion, transparency and accountability.”[60] A priority for Canada is to oversee the implementation of the Canadian-led Joint Statements on Digital Inclusion and AI and Human Rights through the development of national legislation. It has committed to emphasize multi-stakeholder dialogue on Internet shutdowns and “responsible government use of surveillance technology” to support “an open and pluralistic civic space online” and a respect for democratic and human rights values.[61] Lastly, it also prioritizes a multi-stakeholder process “to address online gender-based violence.”[62]
Further Policy Recommendations
While Canada’s digital foreign policy framework is comprehensive, building on years of Canadian-led diplomatic initiatives on democratic digital governance, there are other opportunities for Canadian leadership. Canada was a leader in establishing the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) through hosting the inaugural conference in Montréal in December 2020, establishing the International Centre of Expertise in Montréal for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, and being the 2020-2021 Chair of GPAI. However, the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ Mandate Letter nor the Summit for Democracy Submissions mention the work of GPAI. The FOC Program of Action makes a passing mention of collaboration with GPAI but does not go into detail into what this entails. This indicates that Canada does not see GPAI as an opportunity to advance democratic and human rights values in AI governance. GPAI should not just be an initiative for scientific innovation and expertise but has the potential to be a leader in developing democratic norms for AI governance through the existing multi-stakeholder structure of the organization and advocating for these values in international fora.
Canada must also further commit to engaging non-Western countries to include their perspectives in the development of digital governance norms. Canada’s multilateralism with the Non-Aligned Movement was key to the country’s diplomatic approach during the Cold War. In this author’s conversations with Canadian government officials, there is informal recognition that more must be done to engage developing countries. However, aside from few mentions about engaging other Central and South American states, recent documents do not prioritize this approach. These developing economies “are expected to account for 70 percent of global growth and half of global GDP by 2030” and is already the battleground for technological statecraft.[63] A rationale for Canada’s lack of engagement could be its lower financial capacity to invest in developing countries in infrastructure development. However, Canada must attempt to bridge the Trans-Atlantic divide and guide the development of a common approach to engaging non-Western developing countries. Failure to do so will allow China to “try to sow division… hand China the markets of tomorrow” and create a Sino-centric digital governance world that emphasizes digital authoritarianism.[64]
Conclusion
Canada has developed a comprehensive digital foreign policy strategic vision that positions the country as a leader of digital democratic and human rights values. Through Canadian-led diplomatic initiatives in recent years and through recent document outlining Canada’s priorities, Canada has committed to advocating for the implementation of existing IHRL that applies the same rights offline to the online world. Canada is advocating for a digital inclusion future that promotes freedom of expression, association, assembly, and privacy online; international development consistent with the UN SDGs; and a key emphasis on gender-based digital inclusion and addressing online gender-based violence. Canada has also asserted that effective multilateralism needs a multi-stakeholder approach that draws on the expertise and perspectives of civil society, academia, and the private sector. There are more opportunities that Canada has not yet pursued, such as leveraging its leadership in GPAI and engaging with more non-Western developing countries. However, while China presents a substantial challenge to digital democracy globally through the promotion of digital authoritarianism in its BRI and DSR programs, this moment also presents a unique opportunity for Canada to lead digital democracies, bridge digital divides, and counter anti-democratic modern geopolitical threats. Canada has made its vision for a digital democratic future clear and must act to promote democracy and human rights.
[1] John W. Holmes, “Middle Power,” The Canadian Encyclopedia, May 27, 2020, https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/middle-power.
[2] Global Affairs Canada, “Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy,” February 21, 2017, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/priorities-priorites/policy-politique.aspx?lang=eng.
[3] Government of Canada, “Freedom Online Coalition Program of Action 2022 – Digital Inclusion: A Democratic and Human Rights-Based Vision for the Digital Age (DRAFT – December 9, 2021)” (Freedom Online Coalition, December 9, 2021).
[4] Meia Nouwens, “China’s Digital Silk Road: Integration into National IT Infrastructure and Wider Implications for Western Defence Industries” (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2021), 7, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2021/02/china-digital-silk-road-implications-for-defence-industry.
[5] Jonathan E. Hillman, The Digital Silk Road: China’s Quest to Wire the World and Win the Future (London: Profile Books, 2021), Chapter 1.
[6] Nouwens, “China’s Digital Silk Road,” 7.
[7] Hillman, The Digital Silk Road, Chapter 1; Nouwens, “China’s Digital Silk Road,” 6.
[8] Nouwens, “China’s Digital Silk Road,” 7, emphasis by this author.
[9] Hillman, The Digital Silk Road.
[10] Nouwens, “China’s Digital Silk Road,” 8.
[11] Hillman, The Digital Silk Road.
[12] Hillman.
[13] Hillman.
[14] Hillman.
[15] Björn Fägersten and Tim Rühlig, “China’s Standard Power and Its Geopolitical Implications for Europe,” UI Brief (The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2019), https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-publications/2019/ui-brief-no.-2-2019.pdf.
[16] Hillman, The Digital Silk Road; Nouwens, “China’s Digital Silk Road,” 6.
[17] Nouwens, “China’s Digital Silk Road,” 9.
[18] Nouwens, 9.
[19] Hillman, The Digital Silk Road, Chapter 7.
[20] Hillman, Chapter 7.
[21] Freedom House, “India: Freedom on the Net 2021 Country Report,” 2021, https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-net/2021.
[22] Government of Canada, “Freedom Online Coalition Program of Action 2022 – Digital Inclusion: A Democratic and Human Rights-Based Vision for the Digital Age (DRAFT – December 9, 2021).”
[23] Prime Minister of Canada, “Summit for Democracy 2021 Submission and Commitments: Canada,” December 9, 2021, https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/backgrounders/2021/12/09/summit-democracy-2021-submission-and-commitments-canada.
[24] Prime Minister of Canada.
[25] Government of Canada, “Freedom Online Coalition Program of Action 2022 – Digital Inclusion: A Democratic and Human Rights-Based Vision for the Digital Age (DRAFT – December 9, 2021).”
[26] Government of Canada, “Human Rights and Inclusion in Online and Digital Contexts,” November 24, 2021, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/internet_freedom-liberte_internet.aspx?lang=eng.
[27] Government of Canada.
[28] United Nations Human Rights Council, “Resolution Adopted by the Human Rights Council on 1 July 2016, 32/13. The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet.,” A/HRC/RES/32/13 § (2016), https://undocs.org/A/HRC/RES/32/13.
[29] Government of Canada, “Human Rights and Inclusion in Online and Digital Contexts.”
[30] United Nations Human Rights Council, Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 1 July 2016, 32/13. The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet.
[31] United Nations Human Rights Council.
[32] Global Affairs Canada, “Canada’s FIAP.”
[33] Government of Canada, “Playbook for Gender Equality in the Digital Age,” July 11, 2018, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/playbook-manuel_instructions.aspx?lang=eng.
[34] Government of Canada, “Human Rights and Inclusion in Online and Digital Contexts.”
[35] Marta Morgan, “Speech by Canada’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Marta Morgan to the Freedom Online Coalition Conference 2021 (Transcribed by Angelo Mateo)” (Ottawa, ON, Canada, December 3, 2021).
[36] United Nations Human Rights Council, Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 1 July 2016, 32/13. The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet.
[37] Freedom Online Coalition, “FOC Joint Statement on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights,” Joint Statement (Freedom Online Coalition, November 2020), 2, https://freedomonlinecoalition.com/foc-issues-joint-statement-on-artificial-intelligence-and-human-rights/.
[38] Freedom Online Coalition, 2.
[39] Freedom Online Coalition, 3–4.
[40] Freedom Online Coalition, 4.
[41] United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), “Draft Text of the Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence,” 41 C/73 § (2021), https://en.unesco.org/artificial-intelligence/ethics#drafttext, para. 13.
[42] United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), para. 8.c).
[43] United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), para. 47.
[44] United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), para. 47.
[45] Adam Segal, “China’s Alternative Cyber Governance Regime: Council on Foreign Relations Statement before the U.S. China Economic Security Review Commission,” https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/testimonies/March%2013%20Hearing_Panel%203_Adam%20Segal%20CFR.pdf.
[46] Segal.
[47] Sarah McKune and Shazeda Ahmed, “The Contestation and Shaping of Cyber Norms Through China’s Internet Sovereignty Agenda,” International Journal of Communication 12 (September 18, 2018): 21; Fägersten and Rühlig, “China’s Standard Power and Its Geopolitical Implications for Europe.”
[48] United Nations Human Rights Council, “Resolution Adopted by the Human Rights Council on 13 July 2021, 47/16. The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet.,” A/HRC/RES/47/16 § (2021), https://undocs.org/A/HRC/RES/47/16.
[49] Representative of the People’s Republic of China, “Speech by the Representative of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Human Rights Council on Draft Resolution A/HRC/47/L.22 (Transcribed by Angelo Mateo)” (United Nations Human Rights Council, July 13, 2021), https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1u/k1ug3bjz36.
[50] Representative of the People’s Republic of China.
[51] Representative of the People’s Republic of China.
[52] United Nations Human Rights Council, “China: Amendment to Draft Resolution A/HRC/47/L.22 – A/HRC/47/L.51,” A/HRC/47/L.51 § (2021), https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/47/L.51; United Nations Human Rights Council, “China: Amendment to Draft Resolution A/HRC/47/L.22 – A/HRC/47/L.52,” A/HRC/47/L.52 § (2021), https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/47/L.52; United Nations Human Rights Council, “China: Amendment to Draft Resolution A/HRC/47/L.22 – A/HRC/47/L.53,” A/HRC/47/L.53 § (2021), https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/47/L.53.
[53] Office of the Prime Minister, “Minister of Foreign Affairs Mandate Letter,” Prime Minister of Canada, December 16, 2021, https://pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-letters/2021/12/16/minister-foreign-affairs-mandate-letter.
[54] Office of the Prime Minister.
[55] Prime Minister of Canada, “Summit for Democracy 2021 Submission and Commitments: Canada.”
[56] Morgan, “Speech by Deputy Minister Morgan.”
[57] Government of Canada, “Freedom Online Coalition Program of Action 2022 – Digital Inclusion: A Democratic and Human Rights-Based Vision for the Digital Age (DRAFT – December 9, 2021).”
[58] Government of Canada.
[59] Government of Canada.
[60] Government of Canada.
[61] Government of Canada.
[62] Government of Canada.
[63] Hillman, The Digital Silk Road, Chapter 7.
[64] Hillman, Chapter 7.